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It's Worth the Hassle Part I1: How Does the Baby Veronica
Case Impact Cases Involving Indian Children?
Prof Elizabeth Barker Brandt
I n July 2013, the U.S. SupremeCourt issued its second-ever de-
cision interpreting the Indian
Child Welfare Act' - Adoptive
Couple v. Baby Girl.2 The ma-
jority opinion was authored by Jus-
tice Alito, who was joined by Jus-
tices Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas and
Breyer. Justices Thomas and Breyer
also each filed separate concurring
opinions. Justice Sotomayor filed a
strongly worded dissenting opinion
and was joined by Justices Ginsberg
and Kagan. Justice Scalia joined in
part in the dissent. The decision in
this case is enigmatic as one might
guess from the unusual alignment
of the court with Justice Scalia join-
ingJustice Sotomayor's dissent. The
impact of the decision on family law
and child welfare practice in cases in-
volving Indian children is not clear.
The Adoptive Couple Decision
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl in-
volved an Indian child, Veronica,
from Oklahoma who was placed by
her biological mother through a pri-
vate adoption agency with a couple
in South Carolina. When Veronica's
biological father, a member of the
Cherokee Tribe, was served notice
of the pending adoption, he sought
custody of Veronica. The South Car-
olina Family Court, relying on the
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA),
denied the adoptive couple's adop-
tion petition and awarded custody
to the Indian father. The South Car-
olina Supreme Court affirmed.
The adoptive couple successfully
petitioned for certiorari with the
U.S. Supreme Court. The Court's
majority held that some provisions
of ICWA did not apply. Instead, the
The Court reasoned that there had never been a custodial relationship
of any kind between the father and child, and that, therefore,
there was no "continuing relationship"and the"continued custody"
provision of ICWA did not make sense.
Court, focusing on three provisions
of the statute, concluded that ICWA
does not apply to the narrow cir-
cumstance where a non-Indian par-
ent with sole custodial rights, vol-
untarily initiates a private adoption
proceeding. The Court remanded
the case to South Carolina and or-
dered the child removed from her
father's custody and returned to the
adoptive couple.
First, the Court found that sec-
tion 1912(f)3 - which bars termina-
tion of a parent's rights unless there
is a showing of serious damage to the
child from the parent's "continued
custody" - does not apply when the
parent never had physical or legal
custody of the child. Although Ve-
ronica's parents had been engaged to
be married, at the time she was born
they were no longer in a relation-
ship. Her father was in the military
awaiting immediate deployment
to Afghanistan. Although he must
have known of the child's birth, he
did not contact Veronica's mother,
provide any support for medical care
for the mother or his child, and he
had had no contact with the child
during the first months after Ve-
ronica was born. Focusing on the
term "continued custody,' the Court
reasoned that there had never been
a custodial relationship of any kind
between the father and child, and
that, therefore, there was no "con-
tinuing relationship" and the "con-
tinued custody" provision of ICWA
did not make sense.
Second, the Court found that sec-
tion 1912(d)4 - which bars termina-
tion of a parent's rights without a
showing that active efforts have been
made to prevent the "breakup of the
Indian family" does not apply when
the parent never had a relationship
with the child. The Court focused
on the term "breakup" in this sec-
tion. As with section 1912(f), the
Court reasoned that the absence of
any kind of actual custodial rela-
tionship between the father and the
child meant that such a relationship
could not be "broken up" under the
normal understanding of that term.
Finally, the Majority found that
section 1915(a)' - which establishes
placement preferences for the adop-
tion of Indian children - does not
bar non-Indians from adopting an
Indian child when no other eligible
candidates have sought to adopt
the child.' In Adoptive Couple, the
birth mother of the child arranged
an adoption through a private, out-
of-state agency. The Court rejected
the notion that in such a situation,
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she or the agency should be required
to demonstrate that she had invited
and explored alternative adoptive
placements for the child that com-
plied with the ICWA placement
preferences.
Critique of the decision
in Adoptive Couple
The Court's decision in the Adop-
tive Couple case has been the subject
of intense scrutiny and its impact is
not yet completely clear. While on
its face, the Court's reasoning ap-
pears to grapple with the situation in
a practical, and common-sense way,
the Majority is actually somewhat
myopic and fails to grapple with the
entirety of the statute or with the
larger family law context of the case.
First, the Court majority ignored
the statutory interest of the Chero-
kee Tribe when interpreting the stat-
ute. ICWA's jurisdiction provisions
are the core provisions of the Act
protecting tribes from the continu-
ing outplacement of Indian chil-
dren.7 Pursuant to these provisions,
a tribe has the right to intervene as a
party in a child custody case involv-
ing an Indian child who is a member
of or eligible to be a member of the
tribe in question. Tribes also may try
to seek the transfer of such cases to
tribal court and, in some situations,
may exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over Indian child custody cases. A
tribe's right of intervention is man-
datory and the tribe may exercise the
right at any point in the proceeding.
This right of intervention was in-
cluded in ICWA to not only protect
the best interests of Indian children
by ensuring that state courts consid-
er tribal cultural and social norms,
but also to enable tribes to ensure
compliance with ICWA to protect
their continued existence and integ-
rity.' Thus a tribe's right to interven-
tion under ICWA reflects Congress's
concern that the Indian child's par-
ents might not be in a position to ad-
equately protect the child's interest
in maintaining familial connections
with the tribe or the tribe's interest
in protecting its children.
In Adoptive Couple, the Majority
never considers the tribal role in the
private adoption proceeding. Rather
it focuses exclusively on the father's
lack of early custodial and financial
involvement with Veronica. The
"continued custody" and "active ef-
forts" requirements of ICWA were
interpreted as if the fathers' interest
was the only interest being protect-
ed by the Act, and without regard to
the distinct interests of the Cherokee
Tribe. As a result, the Court renders
the tribe's intervention rights mean-
ingless and nullifies the importance
of the intervention provisions of
ICWA in many private adoption
cases.
Likewise, the Court makes as-
sumptions about state family law
that are not consistent with develop-
ments in the field. Most important-
ly, it concludes that the father had
"relinquished" his custodial rights
and that he had "abandoned his
child" because of his failure to make
contact with the child or provide fi-
nancial support during the mother's
pregnancy or after Veronica's birth.
The Court proceeds based on this
purported "relinquishment" as if the
father has absolutely no cognizable
rights vis- -vis the child.
Yet the father's rights had not
been terminated. Although much
controversy exists regarding the due
process requirement for terminat-
ing the parental rights of an unwed
father, it remains clear that some of-
ficial action is required. The unwed
father may or may not be entitled to
participate in the process depending
on his own conduct. But, without
consent, until a parental termination
or adoption order is entered based
on a constitutional putative father
statute, or until grounds for paren-
tal termination case are proved, the
father has, at minimum, inchoate
legal custody rights. In the Adoptive
Couple case, the father was clearly
angry at the breakup of his relation-
ship with Veronica's mother and his
attention was pulled away by the de-
mands of his ensuing deployment.
His angry, informal communications
with the mother simply cannot, by
themselves, serve as the basis for the
termination of his parental rights.
Beyond his informal communica-
tions, no official action terminating
his parental rights was ever entered
except in the case in which he ap-
peared and objected and which was
appealed to the Supreme Court.
Finally, the Court ignored the
provisions of ICWA that impose
substantial procedural requirements
on the "voluntary termination of
parental rights" In effect, the Court
treated the father's inaction as akin
The Court majority ignored the statutory interest
of the Cherokee Tribe when interpreting the statute.
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to a voluntary termination of his
parental rights and did not require
compliance with the process require-
ments of ICWA. One of the primary
purposes of ICWA is to make the
voluntary placement of Indian chil-
dren more difficult. The provisions
of the Act were a direct response to
evidence in the legislative record es-
tablishing that Indian parents had
often been subjected to threat, pres-
sure and trickery to induce them to
"voluntarily" consent to the termina-
tion of their parental rights Thus,
ICWA requires that voluntary con-
sents to parental termination must
be "executed in writing and recorded
before a judge,' and that the judge
must certify that the "terms and con-
sequences of the consent were fully
explained in detail and were fully
understood by the parent ...- 0
The facts of the father's "relin-
quishment" of his parental rights in
Adoptive Couple evoke images of the
exact practice ICWA was intended to
prevent. In addition to angry per-
sonal texts to his former fianc6, the
father was approached by a process
server in a shopping mall parking
lot just days before his deployment
to Afghanistan. Believing he was
relinquishing his custodial rights
to the child's mother, he accepted
service and signed a "relinquish-
ment" document of some sort. Al-
though he immediately had second
thoughts about signing, the process
server refused to allow the father to
review the papers or reconsider his
signature.
Application of Adoptive Couple
1. The existing Indian family
doctrine
A number of commentators
have speculated that the effect of
the Adoptive Couple decision is to
validate the "existing Indian fam-
ily" exception to ICWA. This excep-
tion, crafted by state courts and not
based on the language of the statute,
holds that ICWA does not apply at
all when a child is not removed from
an existing Indian family. While the
U.S. Supreme Court has never di-
rectly considered this exception to
ICWA, it appears to have rejected the
exception in dicta in Mississippi Band
of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield. 1 The
Court did not reference this excep-
tion in Adoptive Couple.
The Idaho Supreme Court, in
strikingly similar circumstances to
those of Adoptive Couple, rejected the
While the U.S. Supreme Court has
never directly considered
this exception to ICWA,
it appears to have rejected
the exception in dicta in
Mississippi Band of
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield.11
existing Indian family exception in
1993 in Indian Tribe v. Doe.12 In that
case, the Idaho Supreme Court ad-
dressed a situation in which a non-
Indian mother attempted to place
her child in an adoptive placement
through a private adoption agency
without input from the Indian fa-
ther. The Court stated that requir-
ing an Indian child to first be part
of an Indian family before ICWA ap-
plies, "would allow the non-Indian
mother to circumvent application of
ICWA and the tribe's interest in the
child by making sure that the child is
kept away from the reservation and
out of contact with the father and
his family." It concluded that such a
result would "undermine the tribe's
interest in its Indian children, which
the Supreme Court recognized in
[Holyfield]:13
The U.S. Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Adoptive Couple does not
adopt the "existing Indian family"
doctrine. While the decision cer-
tainly appears to have limited the
scope of ICWA in certain private
adoption situations, it does not cre-
ate a wholesale exception to the Act.
For example, under the reasoning in
Adoptive Couple, where the Indian
parent has had physical or legal cus-
tody of a child, or where the adop-
tion is not voluntarily initiated by
a parent, ICWA still applies. Thus,
in the vast majority of ICWA cases,
which involve situations in which a
child is removed from parental cus-
tody through the child protection
system, ICWA applies and Adoptive
Couple does limit the statute.
Even though Adoptive Couple
does not embrace the existing Indi-
an family doctrine, it is still cause for
great concern. In a concurring opin-
ionJustice Breyer expressed concern
about the risk of the decision ex-
cluding too many "absentee Indian
fathers" He cited some examples of
situations in which the decision per-
haps should not apply, such as a case
of a father who has visitation rights
or has paid "all of his child support
obligations;' a case where a father
"was deceived about the existence of
the child' or a situation involving a
"father who was prevented from sup-
porting his child'" 4
2. Child protection cases
The most common cases gov-
erned by ICWA are child protection
The Advocate. October 2014 35
cases. The language of the statute
itself makes clear that Congress was
focused on governmental removals
of Indian children from their fami-
lies without regard for tribal family
and cultural norms. The Adoptive
Couple case will not likely change
child welfare practice in cases involv-
ing Indian children for several rea-
sons.
First, these cases are clearly "re-
movals" - the exact focus of ICWA.
Child welfare cases do not involve
situations in which a parent is seek-
ing to make a voluntary placement
of her or his child.
Second, the Court's concern in
Adoptive Couple that ICWA would
unnecessarily delay safe and loving
placements for children is not di-
rectly implicated by child welfare
cases. The functions and purposes
of the child protection system over-
lap the goals and purposes of ICWA.
The function of the child protection
agency is to reunite a child with her
or his family whenever possible.
State law requires child welfare of-
ficials to make reasonable efforts to
secure reunification and only per-
mits alternative placements upon
substantial showings that either re-
unification cannot occur or that it
would pose serious danger for the
child. Thus ICWA's requirement
of "active efforts" does not raise the
danger that Indian children will be
disadvantaged in finding a perma-
nent and loving home.
Adoptive Couple's significance
for other Idaho Statutes
In recent amendments to the
adoption statute in the Idaho Code,
recognition of the federal mandate
of ICWA was added: "[i]f applicable,
nothing in this chapter shall modi-
fy the requirements of the Indian
Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C.
1902 et seq'15 However, the adop-
Adoptive Couple will likely serve to limit the application
of ICWA for non-custodial Indian fathers, at least in similar
circumstances - private adoption, absent father.
tion statute clearly serves to limit the
rights of unmarried fathers in pro-
ceedings to determine placement of
a child. Thus, while ICWA is specifi-
cally addressed in the Idaho Code,
the outcome in Adoptive Couple will
likely serve to limit the application
of ICWA for non-custodial Indian
fathers, at least in similar circum-
stances - private adoption, absent
father. In a voluntary, private adop-
tion of a child, if the parental rights
of an unmarried Indian father who
has never had a custodial or familial
relationship with his child are prop-
erly terminated under the Idaho stat-
ute, it is likely that ICWA would not
apply.
One other Idaho statute, the
"Safe Haven" statute, 16 is in direct
conflict with ICWA in that it does
not require the birth mother to
identify herself or the child's father,
so there is no required inquiry into
whether the child is enrolled or en-
rollable in a federally recognized
tribe. 7 Should a child be delivered
by a mother to safe haven, it would
be possible that the child would be
placed without regard to status as
an Indian child. Placements under
the Safe Haven statute are not volun-
tary in the same sense as the private
adoption in Adoptive Couple. They
are, in fact, removals in which the
child is in the custody of the state
and a modified child protection pro-
ceeding is employed to secure the
permanent placement of the child.
For that reason, these cases are not
governed by the exception to ICWA
carved out by Adoptive Couple. To
the extent the Safe Haven statute is
inconsistent with ICWA, it is likely
pre-empted by federal law. Special
care should be taken to avoid plac-
ing an Indian child through a safe
haven proceeding.
It IS worth the hassle
Even in the wake of Adoptive
Couple, and the likely narrowing of
ICWA, the underlying reason for its
passage - to protect Indian families
and tribes from loss of their children
and their culture - remains as valid
today as it was in the 1970's. Each
change in the federal government's
approach to tribes, though well in-
tentioned, had dramatic and linger-
ing negative consequences to Indian
families. The ICWA was a way to fi-
nally help fill the gaps left by these
federal policies and it remains an
important tool for Indian people to
preserve their future - their chil-
dren.
The Indian Child Welfare Act of
1978 was a circumstance where good
words and good intentions were
transformed into written law and
where the actual federal policy had a
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positive impact on Indian children.
Chief Joseph once said:
Good words do not last long
unless they amount to some-
thing. Words do not pay for
my dead people. They do not
pay for my country, now over-
run by white men. They do not
protect my father's grave. They
do not pay for all my horses and
cattle. Good words will not
give me back my children...
It makes my heart sick when I
remember all the good words
and all the broken promises. 8
In 1978, the new federal policy of
protecting Indian children from be-
ing placed in non-Indian homes, and
ensuring that a cultural connection
between the child and his/her tribe
was considered by the courts became
just such a law - good words that
amounted to something. After years
of federal policies that diverged from
one extreme to another, ICWA was a
targeted, strategic, practical policy; it
has been protecting Indian children
for 36 years. While it may sometimes
be difficult to apply or enforce, it is
indeed worth the hassle.
ICWA continues to be a tool used
to address the placement of Indian
children removed from their fami-
lies by state child welfare authori-
ties. Compliance with ICWA has
given tribes a role in shaping the safe
placement of their children. Even
so, the problem of the removal of
large numbers of Indian children
from their tribes may remain a seri-
ous problem. In 2013, officials from
several tribes in South Dakota, sued
the state of South Dakota arguing
that it had systematically violated
ICWA. A background story by Na-
tional Public Radio that lead to the
litigation indicated that 87% of the
Indian children in foster care in
South Dakota are placed with white
families.' 9 As this article is written,
the South Dakota litigation is ongo-
ing. To the extent the allegations in
the case have even some merit, they
illustrate the continuing need for
the Act.
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